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THE DMCA AND ORIGINAL EQUIPMENT
MANUFACTURERS: LET CONSUMERS DECIDE
"With regard to monopolies' they are justly classed among the great-
est nusances [sic] in Government. But is it.clear that as encourage-
ments to literary works and ingenious discoveries, they are not too
valuable to be wholly renounced?" 1
INTRODUCTION
Commentators are aflutter over the use of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA) to protect original equipment manufacturers
(OEMs) and their aftermarket goods. 2 Congress enacted the DMCA
to protect digitally transmitted works from being descrambled and
copied.3 While some companies have used the law in its intended
way, OEMs have tried to adapt the law to protect copyrighted works
embedded in replacement products, much to the chagrin of scholars
and analysts.4 Critics point to the legislative history of the Act,5 copy-
right policies, 6 and antitrust law7 to support their argument that
OEMs should not be permitted to apply the DMCA to their goods.
Courts have also rejected these attempts by OEMs, although for dif-
ferent and sometimes curious reasons. 8 But more importantly, critics
argue, Congress should amend the DMCA to clearly deny such com-
panies refuge under the Act.9
This Comment examines the background of the DMCA and its ap-
plication. Part II introduces the Act's purpose and history as well as
1. THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON (William T. Hutchinson et al. eds., University of Chicago
Press 1977) (1788), available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/vlchl4s47.
html.
2. See, e.g., Zohar Efroni, A Momentary Lapse of Reason: Digital Copyright, the DMCA and
a Dose of Common Sense, 28 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 249 (2005) (asserting original equipment
manufacturers should not be protected under the DMCA but noting some courts have left doors
open for them); see also Marcus Howell, The Misapplication of the DMCA to the Aftermarket, 11
B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 128 (2005).
3. Howell, supra note 2, at 128.
4. Id. at 129.
5. Id. at 138-40.
6. See id. at 136-37.
7. Lance C. McCardle, Comment, Despite Congress's Good Intentions, the DMCA's Anti-Cir-
cumvention Provisions Produce a Bad Result-A Means to Create Monopolies, 50 Loy. L. REV.
997, 1020 (2004).
8. See, e.g., Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1192-93 (Fed. Cir.
2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 923 (2005).
9. McCardle, supra note 7, at 1028-29.
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its judicial application to both traditional and unexpected works. 10
Part III addresses the arguments that the DMCA should not apply in
these aftermarket cases." It argues that, as written, the DMCA
should protect such products both because the plain language of the
statute provides OEMs a cause of action, and because there are ex-
ceptions to cover many of the scenarios feared by naysayers. Further,
Part III examines the inconsistencies of appellate decisions and sug-
gests a uniform application of the DMCA.' 2 Finally, Part IV explores
the impact of such an approach. 13 It illustrates that allowing OEMs
protection will not adversely affect consumers in the drastic way many
predict. The law should presume that consumers will make informed,
rational decisions, and the market will regulate itself.
II. BACKGROUND
Congress enacted the DMCA to promote the dissemination of
copyrighted works over electronic media.14 The circuits courts have
applied the law in varying ways depending on the type of work and
the jurisdiction. 15 In Universal City Studios v. Corley, the Second Cir-
cuit found a DMCA violation when hackers decrypted DVDs so users
could copy them. 16 But in Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Con-
trol Components and Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Technolo-
gies, Inc., the Sixth Circuit and Federal Circuit, respectively, declined
to grant relief to nontraditional copyrighted works.' 7 Each court used
different facts and a different legal analysis to preclude manufacturers
from using the DMCA to stop a competitor from selling interoperable
products. 18
This Part discusses the adoption of the DMCA and examines its
various provisions.' 9 Next, it provides an introduction to original
equipment and aftermarket-goods producers. 20 It also presents three
cases illustrating both the traditional and contested applications of the
10. See infra notes 14-162 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 163-244 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 245-310 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 316-363 and accompanying text.
14. S. REP. No. 105-190, at 1-2 (1998).
15. See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001); see also Cham-
berlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S.
923 (2005).
16. Corley, 273 F.3d at 459-60.
17. Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 529 (6th Cir. 2004);
Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1204.
18. Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 551; Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1204.
19. See infra notes 23-41 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 42-53 and accompanying text.
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DMCA.21 Finally, this Part highlights the various points of contention
among scholars and courts that have led many to call for an amend-
ment to the DMCA. 22
A. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act
In today's marketplace, many copyrighted works are produced and
distributed in digital form.23 Authors protect works such as CDs,
DVDs, and MP3s through encryption or other means to prevent
piracy and copying.24 But "technically savvy consumers or copyright
pirates" have found ways to disable or deconstruct these protections.25
Thus, Congress enacted the DMCA to give copyright holders a right
to enforce their technological protections.26 Further, the DMCA en-
sured that U.S. copyright law complied with the World Intellectual
Property Organization Copyright Treaty (WCT), which requires "ade-
quate legal protection and effective legal remedies against the circum-
vention of effective technological measures used by authors to protect
their copyrighted works."' 27 Under the DMCA, copyright holders can
"lock" their works and pursue remedies against those who either un-
lock the works or distribute "keys" without permission. 28 The copy-
right owner's rights under the DMCA go beyond the normal
infringement rights that prevent unauthorized copying,29 but courts
have deemed the rights new "causes of action for liability" rather than
new property rights.30
The DMCA has a number of subparts, which include access provi-
sions and trafficking provisions. 31 The access provision, Section
1201(a), makes it illegal to "circumvent a technological measure that
effectively controls access to a [copyrighted] work."' 32 The anti-traf-
ficking provision, Section 1201(b), prohibits manufacturing, import-
21. See infra notes 54-98 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 99-162 and accompanying text.
23. Howell, supra note 2, at 129.
24. Id. at 129-30.
25. Id. at 130.
26. Id.; see also 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000).
27. McCardle, supra note 7, at 1004.
28. Paul R. Kitch, DMCA Is OEMs [sic] Ticket to "Super-Patenting" the Unpatentable, 17 IN-
TELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 5. 5-6 (2005).
29. Howell, supra note 2, at 130; see also 17 U.S.C. § 106.
30. Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1192-94 (Fed. Cir. 2004),
cert. denied, 544 U.S. 923 (2005).
31. McCardle, supra note 7, at 1005.
32. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a). Circumventing a technological measure means "to descramble a
scrambled work, to decrypt an encrypted work, or otherwise to avoid, bypass, remove, deacti-
vate, or impair a technological measure, without the authority of the copyright owner." 17
U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(A).
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ing, or otherwise trafficking in devices that are designed to circumvent
technological measures protecting a copyright holder's rights. 33
The statute also provides a number of exemptions from liability. 34
The reverse-engineering exception in Section 1201(f) states that a per-
son who "'lawfully obtain[s] the right to use a copy of a computer
program' may circumvent any access controls for the 'sole purpose' of
achieving interoperability with an 'independently created computer
program."35 This Section allows others to "create tools for bypassing
the protection measure to allow ... programs to communicate with
each other. ' 36 The words "independently created" in the statute are
important in the context of aftermarket equipment, as competitors
must often copy portions of existing software, rather than create them
from scratch, to create interoperable products. 37
Further, the DMCA allows the Librarian of Congress to exempt
particular works from protection. 38 The exemptions are determined
and reassessed every three years, according to various factors related
to fair use.39 Additionally, the exemptions apply only to the "anti-
access anti-circumvention provision" and not the "anti-trafficking and
anti-copying" subparts. 40 Because they are narrowly drafted, these
exemptions have not had 'much effect on the DMCA's practical
application. 41
33. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b).
34. Daniel C. Higgs, Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc. & Cham-
berlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Technologies, Inc.: The DMCA and Durable Goods Aftermarkets,
19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 59, 64 (2004).
35. Id. at 65 (alterations in original) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f)).
36. Id. at 81.
37. See, e.g., Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 2d 943, 971
(E.D. Ky. 2003), vacated by 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004) (explaining that an exact copy of the
plaintiff's computer program does not constitute an independently created program).
38. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C).
39. Diane M. Barker, Defining the Contours of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act The
Growing Body of Case Law Surrounding the DMCA, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 47, 53-54 (2005).
The Librarian considers several factors:
(i) The availability for use of copyrighted works; (ii) The availability for use of works
for nonprofit, archival, preservation, and educational purposes; (iii) The impact that the
prohibition on circumvention of technological measures applied to copyrighted works
has on criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research; (iv) The
effect of circumvention of technological measures on the market for or value of copy-
righted works; and (v) Such other factors as the Librarian considers appropriate.
Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C)).
40. McCardle, supra note 7, at 1024.
41. Barker, supra note 39, at 55.
[Vol. 56:153
2006] THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT 157
B. Original Equipment Manufacturers and the Aftermarket
Original equipment manufacturers create initial goods such as
printers, automobiles, and garage door openers.42 Original equipment
often uses aftermarket products as replacement parts or accessories. 43
In the United States, the aftermarket constitutes a significant part of
the economy.44 Aftermarket goods tie into the DMCA because they
often must communicate with the original equipment, typically
through computer software.45 To enable this communication, compet-
itors reverse-engineer the original equipment and write code to allow
interoperability. 46 One example of this is an ink cartridge that talks to
the printer, informing it of whether the cartridge is the correct brand
or running out of ink. 47 Software contained in the cartridge must in-
teract with software contained in the printer in order to function. 48
The Copyright Act does not protect useful or functional items, but it
does protect computer source code and object code.49 Thus, many
OEMs are able to copyright their embedded programs.50
Aftermarket goods are different from typical copyrighted works in
that the embedded programs are not sold independently, unlike
DVDs or other creative works.51 Interoperable products have copy-
righted works that are "merely incidental" to the primary product.5 2
Further, the good itself is functional, rather than being a mere vehicle
for copyright delivery like a disc or game cartridge.5 3
42. See Kitch, supra note 28, at 5 (explaining how OEMs can gain monopolies on the
aftermarket supplements to original equipment like automobiles); see also Jacqueline Lipton,
The Law of Unintended Consequences: The Digital Millennium Copyright Act and Interoper-
ability, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 487, 496-98 (2005) (discussing interoperable replacement
parts).
43. Howell, supra note 2, at 131-32. Examples of such aftermarket goods are windshield wip-
ers for a car or inkjet cartridges for a printer. Id.
44. Id. at 131 (citing Brief of Amicus Curiae Consumers Union Supporting Skylink Technolo-
gies, Inc.'s Opposition to the Chamberlain Group, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment at 6,
Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 292 F. Supp. 2d 1023 (N.D. Il. 2003) (No. 02 C
6376)).
45. Id. at 132-33.
46. Id. at 133.
47. Id.
48. Lipton, supra note 42, at 496-97.
49. Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1233 (3d Cir. 1986). "A
,useful article' is an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray
the appearance of the article or to convey information." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
50. See infra note 196.
51. Howell, supra note 2, at 132.
52. Lipton, supra note 42, at 525.
53. Howell, supra note 2, at 132.
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C. Corley
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley54 is an example of the way
many critics expected the DMCA to protect copyrighted works from
decryption and copying.55 Motion picture makers changed the form
of film distribution in the 1990s from analog videotapes to digital
DVDs. 56 Film studios then became concerned that an educated con-
sumer could copy the DVDs, so they encrypted the content using the
"Content Scramble System" or CSS.57 A Norwegian computer
programmer named Jon Johansen wrote software to decrypt CSS, os-
tensibly to allow users to view DVDs on Linux rather than Microsoft
operating systems.58 Johansen placed the object code (code used by
the computer to execute the program) for the software on the in-
ternet, where hacker Eric Corley discovered it and posted the source
code (readable by users and easily copied) on his own website, along
with an article detailing CSS decryption. 59 The plaintiff movie stu-
dios 60 sued Corley under the DMCA for trafficking devices designed
to circumvent encryption measures. 6t
Corley's defense focused primarily on the constitutionality of the
DMCA. Specifically, he argued that the decryption software consti-
tuted speech and that the restriction on that speech was not content
neutral. 62 The Second Circuit held that the software, although written
in code and requiring computer execution, was speech for First
Amendment purposes, but still upheld the constitutionality of the
Act.63 The court rejected the defendant's argument that the pur-
chaser of the DVD has the copyright owner's permission to decrypt
it.64 The court ultimately held Corley liable under the DMCA. 65
54. 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
55. Higgs, supra note 34, at 65-66.
56. Corley, 273 F.3d at 436.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 437.
59. Id. at 438-39.
60. The plaintiffs in the case were Universal City Studios, Inc.. Paramount Pictures Corp.,
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc., Tristar Pictures, Inc., Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc.,
Time Warner Entertainment Co., L.P., Disney Enterprises, Inc., and Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corp. Id. at 429.
61. Id. at 441.
62. Corley, 273 F.3d at 442.
63. Id. at 447.
64. Id. at 444.
65. Id. at 459-60.
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D. Lexmark and Chamberlain
After Corley led to a number of victories for copyright holders, 66
OEMs began attempting to use the DMCA to protect their copy-
righted computer programs. 67 In Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static
Control Components, Inc., a printer and toner cartridge manufacturer
sued for violation of the DMCA. 68 Lexmark inserted microchips in its
toner cartridges that performed a "handshake" with the printer that
allowed the printer to function. 69 Lexmark needed this handshake
protection because it offered customers a discount on the initial
printer purchase if the buyers promised to use only Lexmark toner
cartridges.70 Accordingly, the microchip in the toner cartridge in-
formed the printer that the user was complying with the agreement by
using a Lexmark product, and the printer would function. 71
Defendant Static Control Components (SCC) created a microchip
that copied Lexmark's chip.72 SCC sold the chip to generic toner
manufacturers and advertised that it "breaks Lexmark's 'secret
code."73 Lexmark filed a suit alleging, inter alia, that SCC violated
the DMCA by distributing a product designed to circumvent the con-
trols on Lexmark's copyrighted programs.74
The district court granted a preliminary injunction, finding Lexmark
had a likelihood of success on its DMCA claims because the SCC
microchips were created to circumvent encryption, and the plain lan-
guage of the statute awarded DMCA protection for all copyrighted
works. 75 The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the DMCA applied
only to technological measures that effectively control access to a
copyrighted work.76 The court noted that Lexmark did not effectively
control access because any user who purchased the toner cartridge
could access the microchip. 77 Thus, a user could copy the object code
66. See, e.g., United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Universal
City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 346 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Sony Computer Entm't
Am. Inc. v. Gamemasters, 87 F. Supp. 2d 976 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
67. Higgs, supra note 34, at 69.
68. 387 F.3d 522, 529 (6th Cir. 2004).
69. Id. at 530.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 531.
75. Higgs, supra note 34, at 72-73 (citing Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components,
Inc., 253 F. Supp. 2d 943, 969 (E.D. Ky. 2003), vacated by 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004)).
76. Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 546.
77. Id.
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and translate it into source code. 78 Further, the court drew a distinc-
tion between cases like Corley where the software (CSS) protects the
work (motion picture) and the software's execution generates an addi-
tional copyrighted work, and those like Lexmark where the protected
software itself does not create any works. 79 Finally, the court pointed
to congressional intent, noting that nothing in the legislative history
indicated an intent to protect consumer goods such as ball point pen
cartridges, printer cartridges, and garage door openers.80
Chamberlain presented a similar claim brought under the DMCA
by an OEM seeking to protect aftermarket goods.81 Chamberlain
manufactured and sold various garage door openers.82 One issue with
conventional openers was that would-be criminals could intercept the
code sent from the remote to the opener, copy it, and later use it to
break into a home. 83 In response, Chamberlain created a "rolling
code system," which continuously changed the code used to open the
door. 84
Skylink created a competing transmitter which allowed users to cir-
cumvent the rolling code security and operate Chamberlain openers.8 5
To use a Skylink transmitter, the user programmed the Chamberlain
opener to recognize it.86 Also, the Skylink transmitter code was not
rolling-unlike Chamberlain's. 8 7  Chamberlain sued under the
DMCA, alleging that Skylink's disabling of the rolling code feature
meant a burglar could intercept the code and later use it to operate a
Chamberlain opener.88 Thus, it argued Skylink was trafficking in de-
vices solely designed to circumvent technological measures that pro-
tected the copyrighted opener programs.8 9
The court rejected Chamberlain's DMCA claims. 90 First, it held
that any circumvention of a technological measure must be related to
78. Id.; Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 12, Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc.,
544 U.S. 923 (2005) (No. 04-997), available at 2005 WL 190364; cf. Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung,
422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005) (distinguishing Lexmark because neither defendants nor users could
have read code without impermissibly circumventing protections).
79. Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 548.
80. Id. at 549.
81. Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. de-
nied, 544 U.S. 923 (2005).
82. Id. at 1183.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1184.
85. Id. at 1183.
86. Id. at 1185.
87. Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1184.
88. Id. at 1185.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1197-1204.
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some copyright protection to qualify as a DMCA violation. 91 It con-
trasted the Chamberlain situation with other cases in which the cir-
cumvention led to or facilitated reproduction or distribution, which
are rights protected under the Copyright Act.92 The court was not
persuaded by Chamberlain's statutory argument, which noted that
Section 1201(a)(2) prevents access while Section 1201(b)(1) prohibits
facilitating access that can lead to copying, thus seeming to indicate
that Section 1201(a)(2) protects a new "copyright"-that of access. 93
Second, the court analyzed how the question of authority related to
circumvention. 94 The court pointed to the DMCA provision which
prohibits circumvention in order to prevent unauthorized access.95 It
noted Chamberlain could not prevent purchasers of its copyrighted
computer programs from accessing the software. 96 Thus, the court
reasoned that legitimate purchasers of a copyrighted work obtain the
rights to certain uses of the work. 97 The court therefore determined
that purchasers had the requisite authority to circumvent the rolling
code encryption. 98
E. The Problem
Critics have attacked attempts to use the DMCA to protect OEMs'
aftermarket goods for various reasons. 99 Many point to the legislative
intent behind the Act and to the general policies underlying intellec-
tual property law.100 Additionally, commentators note the confusion
among the circuits regarding the application of the DMCA in areas of
user authority 0 1 and infringement.10 2 Finally, and most significantly,
91. Id. at 1199. Chamberlain did not assert that Skylink infringed its traditional copyrights in
any way. Id. at 1185.
92. Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1199; see also 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
93. Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1199; see also Efroni, supra note 2, at 309.
94. Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1202.
95. Id.; see also 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a).
96. Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1202.
97. Id. at 1203.
98. Id. at 1203-04.
99. See, e.g., Howell, supra note 2, at 138-40 (arguing that legislative history shows Congress
did not intend to protect OEMs); see also Stacy L. Dogan & Joseph P. Liu, Copyright Law and
Subject Matter Specificity: The Case of Computer Software, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 203,
226 (2005) ("While such a narrow interpretation of the DMCA may be supported by the literal
text of the statute, the use of the DMCA for these purposes was clearly outside the DMCA's
intended scope."); McCardle, supra note 7, at 1020-21 (discussing the potential for monopolies
on aftermarket goods if OEMs obtain the right to use the DMCA).
100. See generally Jane C. Ginsburg, Legal Protection of Technological Measures Protecting
Works of Authorship: International Obligations and the US Experience, 29 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS
11, 25 (2005) ("As a policy matter, this is inconceivable."); Howell, supra note 2, at 136-40.
101. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 78, at 10-11.
102. See Kitch, supra note 28, at 9-10.
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they are concerned with preventing anti-competitive monopolies by
OEMs. 0 3
1. Should the DMCA Apply to OEMs?
An important threshold question is whether OEMs may impose lia-
bility upon competitors under the DMCA. Commentators firmly be-
lieve that Congress did not intend to protect such extended
monopolies.10 4 Many people are concerned that the exceptions Con-
gress wrote into the statute are not enough, and OEMs can still run
rampant. 105 Further, they point to general theories of intellectual
property law that generally disfavor monopolies. 106 Finally, many
identify copyright doctrines which should preclude OEM relief.
10 7
a. Legislative Intent and Statutory Interpretation
Critics argue that the legislative history and remarks associated with
the DMCA show that Congress did not intend to protect aftermarket
goods. 108 One commentator points to Congress's cautious approach
toward the legislation, which was ultimately passed only to ensure
compliance with WCT policies.10 9 Further, Congress "delayed the ef-
fective date of Section 1201(a) for two years."'110
Others note Congress explicitly stated its intention that the DMCA
does not "affect rights, remedies, limitations, or defenses to copyright
infringement, including fair use, under [the copyright act].' 1 1 Thus,
Congress did not intend to create a new right under which manufac-
turers can seek refuge. 1 2 Analysts highlight the legislation's stated
purpose to "curtail piracy of intellectual property, particularly over
the Internet.11 3 And while WCT compliance was one concern, per-
sistent lobbying by the owners of copyrights of digital works like mo-
103. See, e.g., McCardle, supra note 7, at 1020-21.
104. Howell, supra note 2, at 139-40.
105. McCardle, supra note 7, at 1022.
106. See, e.g., Howell, supra note 2, at 136.
107. See, e.g., id. at 137 (arguing that both the merger and copyright misuse doctrines should
apply to prevent OEMs from successfully using the DMCA to protect their works).
108. Id. at 138-40.
109. Id. at 139. The WCT, enacted in 1996, requires member countries to provide a cause of
action against those who circumvent copyright holders' technological measures. S. REP. No.
105-190, at 10 (1998).
110. Howell, supra note 2, at 139.
111. Lipton, supra note 42, at 541 (alterations in original) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1)
(2000)).
112. Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1192 (Fed. Cir. 2004),
cert. denied, 544 U.S. 923 (2005).
113. Higgs, supra note 34, at 80 (pointing out that the DMCA's purpose is "to make digital
networks safe places to disseminate and exploit copyrighted materials," and that it was drafted
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tion pictures and music caused Congress to take action.11 4 Such
commentators argue that nowhere in the lengthy legislative history
did Congress mention or imply any intent to protect aftermarket
goods.1 15
Further, critics point to the various exemptions as evidence of con-
gressional intent to refuse aftermarket producers DMCA rights. 1 6
The interoperability exemption of Section 1201(f) could indicate legis-
lative foresight that software creators might attempt to protect their
embedded works.117 Congress apparently wanted to allow software
companies to continue to innovate and create programs that interact
with existing components." t8 Additionally, analysts note that certain
entities are exempt from liability based on educational or nonprofit
status and suggest that the Act was not intended to stop the free flow
of ideas among students, scholars, and the government. 119
b. General Principles of IP
General intellectual property law suggests aftermarket manufactur-
ers should seek protection in the patent system and cease attempts to
obtain perpetual monopolies.' 20 The primary purpose of patent and
copyright law is "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts.' 21 The laws provide innovators with a "limited monopoly" as
an incentive to further create and invent.' 22 This reward ultimately
requires the author or inventor to dedicate the work to the public
upon the monopoly's expiration.123
Some believe aftermarket producers should protect their works
with patents rather than copyrights.' 24 Patents give inventors signifi-
cant monopolies over the rights to make, use, or sell certain goods.125
But patents are costly and their protection is brief-twenty years from
their filing date.126 Copyright protection is less expensive, easier to
"to protect copyright owners, and simultaneously allow the development of technology" (quot-
ing S. REP. No. 105-190, at 1, 29)).
114. Barker, supra note 39, at 48.
115. Howell, supra note 2, at 139-40.
116. Id. at 140-41.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 141.
119. Id. at 140.
120. Id. at 138.
121. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
122. Howell, supra note 2, at 136-37 (citing United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111,
1140 (N.D. Cal. 2002)).
123. Id.
124. See id. at 138.
125. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000).
126. Kitch, supra note 28, at 5.
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acquire, and provides rights for a longer amount of time.127 But copy-
rights extend only to "original works of authorship fixed in any tangi-
ble medium" and do not protect functional items or devices. 128
Further, intellectual property owners cannot extend their rights
fraudulently. 129 Various provisions of the Patent Act prevent inven-
tors from exploiting their monopolies beyond the statutory period.130
Inventors may not obtain patents on items in public use or on sale
more than one year prior to the application date, because that would
give that inventor additional time in which to dominate the market.' 3'
The idea/expression merger doctrine in copyright law also prevents
authors from monopolizing a certain expression when it is the only
possible way to communicate an idea. 132
One writer notes that the DMCA allows aftermarket good manu-
facturers to obtain a "super-patent" or "super-monopoly" because it
combines protections under both the patentand copyright laws. 133 He
notes that the protection extends to devices, but provides the longer
copyright protection and does not impose patent law's requirements
of novelty and nonobviousness, thus making it easier to obtain.1 34
Others call the rights obtained under the DMCA "paracopyright" be-
cause they are independent of traditional copyrights.1 35 Therefore,
one could read the DMCA in light of these overarching goals to pro-
tect only creative works, rather than simple computer programs. 136
2. User Authority
Circuit courts disagree over whether a user's purchase provides the
authority necessary to preclude the application of the DMCA. 137 In
Corley, the defendant argued that a DVD purchaser "has the 'author-
ity of the copyright owner' to view the DVD, and therefore is ex-
empted from the DMCA . . . when the buyer circumvents an
127. Id. Copyright protection extends for the life of the author plus seventy years, or in the
case of a work made for hire, ninety-five years from publication or 120 years from creation,
whichever is shorter. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000).
128. 17 U.S.C. § 102; see also Kitch, supra note 28, at 5.
129. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. United States, 654 F.2d 55, 61 (Ct. CI. 1981) (noting a policy
behind the patent on-sale bar is to prevent inventors from exploiting their monopolies "beyond
the statutorily authorized 17-year period").
130. Id.
131. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
132. Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 705 (2d Cir. 1991).
133. Kitch, supra note 28, at 5.
134. Id.
135. Higgs, supra note 34, at 63 (citing 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT § 12A.18[B] (2003)).
136. See Howell, supra note 2, at 138.
137. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 78, at 10.
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encryption technology. '' 138 But the court rejected this argument, stat-
ing that buying a DVD gives the consumer the copyright holder's per-
mission to use the DVD but not to decrypt it. 139
The Federal Circuit applied different reasoning in Chamberlain.140
Chamberlain argued that consumers who purchase garage door open-
ers have the copyright holder's permission to use the software when
operating the product, but not to access the software through decryp-
tion.14' The court would not separate such actions, however, holding
that "[c]onsumers who purchase a product containing a copy of em-
bedded software have the inherent legal right to use that copy of the
software. ' 142 It noted that because the sales were unrestricted, con-
sumers had implied permission to use the Chamberlain software and
were therefore authorized to use the Skylink remotes. 143 In fact, the
district court judge explained that'"consumers have a reasonable ex-
pectation that they can replace the original product without violating
federal law. '144
One commentator suggests that the "first sale" doctrine should ap-
ply in these cases.145 This doctrine "provides that copyright holders
are limited in the extent to which they can control after-market uses
of a copyright work after the first sale of the work. '146 A copyright
owner can profit from the first sale of his work, but cannot control
future sales nor require royalties from the original purchaser. 147
Courts could apply this doctrine in the area of aftermarket goods by
establishing that once the initial sale of the embedded software is
made to a consumer, the manufacturer can no longer control its use-
barring infringement.1 48 Thus, when a consumer purchases a good
containing software that interoperates with replacement parts, the ex-
tent of his rights is unclear.149
138. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 444 (2d Cir. 2001).
139. Id.
140. Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2004),
cert. denied, 544 U.S. 923 (2005).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Kitch, supra note 28, at 9.
144. Lipton, supra note 42, at 512 (quoting Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc.,
292 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1046 (N.D. 11. 2003), affd, 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544
U.S. 923 (2005)).
145. Id. at 537-39.
146. Id. at 537 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2000)).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 538.
149. Id. at 513.
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3. Proof of Infringement
The circuit courts are also in conflict about the extent to which in-
fringement should play a role in DMCA causes of action.'50 The
Chamberlain court held that the DMCA protects access to a work
only when it is linked to protection from piracy.15' It pointed to the
congressional statement that the DMCA does not create a new prop-
erty right, but was enacted to prevent facilitation of infringement.15 2
But the Chamberlain holding seems to contradict the plain language
of the statute, which does not explicitly require allegations of copy-
right infringement. 153 It also "does not necessarily reflect the actual
drafting of the DMCA, nor does it represent past judicial interpreta-
tions of the DMCA.' 54 The DMCA merely requires a circumvention
of a technological measure which controls access, but makes no refer-
ence to a showing of infringement. 155 This provision, as interpreted by
the Chamberlain court, might not comply with the United States' obli-
gation under the WCT, which requires protection for copyright hold-
ers from circumvention of technological security measures. 156 Given
the plain language of the statute, should courts require a showing of
infringement to trigger DMCA protections?
4. Potential Impact
One of the biggest concerns with allowing aftermarket goods pro-
tection under the DMCA is the potential effect it would have on con-
sumers and the free market economy. 157 Critics point out that, as
written, the DMCA protects all copyrighted works, whether the work
is the focus of the purchase or whether it is of "minimal significance to
a larger product. 158 Some fear that manufacturers could insert insig-
nificant computer programs in all goods, thus preventing competitors
from creating replacement parts without violating the DMCA. 159 The
example most often cited is an automobile in which a manufacturer
could create monopolies on replacement goods like "oil filters, wind-
150. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 78, at 10.
151. Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2004),
cert. denied, 544 U.S. 923 (2005).
152. Id. at 1200.
153. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 78, at 9.
154. Lipton, supra note 42, at 529.
155. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2000).
156. See infra note 308 and accompanying text; see also 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A).
157. Howell, supra note 2, at 135.
158. McCardle, supra note 7, at 1020.
159. Id. at 1021.
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shield wipers, tires, [and] batteries. 1 60 Manufacturers would then be
able to create tying arrangements that might violate antitrust laws.' 6'
In any event, some critics argue that whether this "constraint on sub-
sequent uses of a product" is illegal or not should be determined
through contract and competition laws rather than through the
DMCA. t 62
III. ANALYSIS
Analysis of the legislative history, general principles of intellectual
property, and the statutory requirements does not necessarily lead to
the conclusion that aftermarket goods should be refused protection.
Congress did not explicitly state its intention to exclude such products
from the statute and, in fact, created exceptions which indicate the
goods were covered. 163 Further, Congress allows intellectual property
owners substantial monopolies or exclusive rights in other areas.164
Finally, although courts have thus far ruled against OEMs, their rea-
soning conflicts as to what constitutes circumvention authority and
whether infringement is a necessary component of a cause of action,
and this leaves the door open for companies to find relief under the
DMCA in the future. 65
A. The DMCA Should Apply to OEMs
Much of the DMCA discussion is related to whether OEMs should
be allowed to seek relief under the statute.166 Various portions of the
legislative history indicate that Congress considered OEMs and in-
tended to protect them to some extent.1 67 Statutory analysis leads to a
conclusion that embedded computer programs-if copyrightable-
should be protected. Additionally, the general policies of intellectual
160. Id. at 1021-22 (explaining how this could also affect manufacturers of replacement
household goods like "coils, hoses, and pipes," "lamps and light bulbs," "remote controls and
batteries," and "ball point pens and ink refills"); see also Howell, supra note 2. at 135-36 (citing
the ink cartridge industry as an example of a low price initial purchase followed by forced
purchase of expensive aftermarket goods); Lipton, supra note 42, at 489 (discussing, as an exam-
ple, the impact on consumers' ability to purchase replacement remote controls for televisions).
161. Lipton, supra note 42, at 497; see also Indep. Ink, Inc. v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc., 396 F.3d
1342, vacated, 126 S. Ct. 1281 (2006) (explaining patent tying in the context of printheads and ink
supply systems).
162. Lipton, supra note 42, at 497.
163. See infra notes 170-214 and accompanying text.
164. See infra notes 215-244 and accompanying text.
165. See infra notes 245-310 and accompanying text.
166. See, e.g., McCardle, supra note 7, at 1018-19; see also Efroni, supra note 2.
167. See infra notes 170-214 and accompanying text.
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property law do not preclude OEM use of the DMCA. 168 Thus, courts
should extend the DMCA cause of action to these OEM devices just
as they have for traditional copyrighted works.169
1. Legislative History and Statutory Interpretation Show
Congressional Acknowledgment of OEM Protection
The legislative silence regarding protection for aftermarket goods
can be interpreted differently than it is by those who claim victory for
generic manufacturers. 170 In some of its discussions, Congress specifi-
cally referred to the protection of computer programs 171 and the ques-
tion of interoperability. 172 Congress noted that it expected that the
reverse-engineering exception would allow continued innovation. 173
These comments show that Congress contemplated the effects on vari-
ous types of copyrighted materials and made a conscious choice to
protect "work[s] protected under [the Copyright Act]' 74 without ref-
erence to the particular class of work.
Further, various current exemptions show that Congress considered
the effect of the DMCA on the aftermarket. 175 First, the Act provides
for the Librarian of Congress (LOC) to exclude certain classes of
works from liability under subparagraph (A).1 7 6 The LOC makes
such determinations based on recommendations from the Register of
Copyrights. 177 The exemptions are assessed every three years.1 78 This
exemption is an adequate safeguard for the anti-access provision be-
cause it allows flexibility for unforeseen consequences. One writer ar-
gues that courts, rather than the LOC, should make the exemption
decisions because they are better equipped for extensive discovery
and factual analysis. 179 But the Register of Copyrights is certainly in a
position to understand the effects of various exemptions. 180 It is logi-
168. See infra notes 215-244 and accompanying text.
169. See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
170. See, e.g., Howell, supra note 2, at 133-39 (suggesting that Congress's silence should be
interpreted as an intent to preclude OEM protection).
171. S. REP. No. 105-190, at 10 (1998) (noting that the WCT specifically recognized protection
of computer programs under the Berne Convention).
172. Id. at 13 (discussing the purpose of the reverse-engineering exception of § 1201(f)).
173. Id. ("The purpose of this section is to foster competition and innovation in the computer
and software industry.").
174. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a)(1)(A) (2000); see also S. REP. No. 105-190, at 11.
175. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(D), (f).
176. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(D).
177. Barker, supra note 39, at 53.
178. McCardle, supra note 7, at 1025.
179. Id.
180. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 409 (detailing the information the Register of Copyrights examines
for each application).
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cal to empower the agency that determines copyright allowance to de-
termine whether there are classes of protected works which do not
warrant DMCA safeguards. Because the Copyright Office sees or has
access to all applications, it can determine the status of various kinds
of works, including trivial computer programs. This provides confi-
dence and clarity for potential litigants.1 81
The LOC exception applies only to the anti-access provision. 182
Thus, aftermarket manufacturers who create interoperable goods and
are sued under the anti-trafficking provision cannot be exempted
under Section 1201(a)(1)(D). 83 Accordingly, Congress should amend
the DMCA to provide a similar exemption under the trafficking por-
tion of the Act.1 84
The reverse-engineering exception shows Congress understood the
Act's potential implications.18 5 Congress wanted to ensure software
developers would continue to create interoperable programs, so it cre-
ated Section 1201(f) to protect independently created works produced
for interoperability.18 6 Some argue the exception is too narrow be-
181. See Howell, supra note 2, at 146 (noting that predictability is an essential part of the
solution to resolving the DMCA conflict). Some argue that because the LOC exemptions
change every three years, there is a lack of predictability. See, e.g., McCardle, supra note 7, at
1025. But clear statutory delineation seems preferable to inconsistent case-by-case analysis.
182. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C). The relevant provision reads as follows:
During the 2-year period described in subparagraph (A), and during each succeeding
3-year period, the Librarian of Congress, upon the recommendation of the Register of
Copyrights, who shall consult with the Assistant Secretary for Communications and
Information of the Department of Commerce and report and comment on his or her
views in making such recommendation, shall make the determination in a rulemaking
proceeding for purposes of subparagraph (B) of whether persons who are users of a
copyrighted work are, or are likely to be in the succeeding 3-year period, adversely
affected by the prohibition under subparagraph (A) in their ability to make noninfring-
ing uses under this title of a particular class of copyrighted works.
Id.
183. McCardle, supra note 7, at 1024-25.
184. Id. at 1026-27.
185. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f)(1). The relevant provision reads as follows:
Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a)(1)(A), a person who has lawfully
obtained the right to use a copy of a computer program may circumvent a technological
measure that effectively controls access to a particular portion of that program for the
sole purpose of identifying and analyzing those elements of the program that are neces-
sary to achieve interoperability of an independently created computer program with
other programs, and that have not previously been readily available to the person en-
gaging in the circumvention, to the extent any such acts of identification and analysis do
not constitute infringement under this title.
Id.
186. Howell, supra note 2, at 141 (citing Brief of Amicus Curiae Consumers Union Support-
ing Skylink Technologies, Inc.'s Opposition to the Chamberlain Group, Inc.'s Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment at 10, Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 292 F. Supp. 2d 1023
(N.D. 11. 2003) (No. 02 C 6376)).
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cause it only exempts works created "independently," and many inter-
operable works need to directly copy the original work. 8 7 But the
exception's existence shows a deliberate intent to exclude certain
goods.188 If Congress had intended that aftermarket producers would
not be protected under the general DMCA provisions, the 1201(f) ex-
emption would be superfluous. Where it is evident Congress wanted
to exempt or protect a certain class of goods, courts should honor that
intent.1 89
The plain language of the DMCA protects embedded computer
programs in aftermarket goods. 190 The statute refers to "a work pro-
tected under this title,"191 meaning it applies to works as defined in
Section 102.192 As previously noted, a computer source code is pro-
tected as a "literary work" to the extent it is nonfunctional. 193 Courts
should abide by the plain language of the statute.1 94 Where an em-
bedded program is protected by the Copyright Act, it should also have
DMCA protection. 195
In both Lexmark and Chamberlain, the OEMs registered their pro-
grams with the Copyright Office. 196 Registration within five years of
first publication is prima facie evidence of the copyright's validity.' 97
Accordingly, the programs' copyrights should have been presumed
valid. Thus, the embedded programs qualified as "work[s] protected
under this title." 198
187. Howell, supra note 2, at 141-42.
188. See S. REP. No. 105-190, at 13 (1998).
189. See Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 452-53 (2002).
190. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) ("No person shall circumvent a technological measure that
effectively controls access to a work protected under this title."); see also Kitch, supra note 28, at
12 ("[A] careful review of the language of the statute and [the Chamberlain and Lexmark] deci-
sions indicates that, if done properly, the super-monopoly is still a viable weapon.").
191. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A).
192. 17 U.S.C. § 102.
193. Id.; see also Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1233-34 (3d
Cir. 1986) (explaining that creative aspects of computer programs may be copyrightable).
194. See Kitch, supra note 28, at 10 ("[The Chamberlain] decision .. .ignores the plain lan-
guage of § 1201(a)(2) ...."); see also Barnhart, 534 U.S. at 450 ("As in all statutory construction
cases, we begin with the language of the statute.").
195. Cf. McCardle, supra note 7, at 1020 ("As currently drafted, the DMCA is too widely
drawn because the anti-circumvention provisions give added protection to all works protected by
the Copyright Act.").
196. Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 530 (6th Cir. 2004)
("Lexmark obtained Certificates of Registration from the Copyright Office for both pro-
grams."); Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1185 n.4 (Fed. Cir.
2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 923 (2005) ("According to Chamberlain, the transmitter program is
registered with the United States Copyright Office as No. TX5-533-065, and the computer pro-
gram in the receiver is registered with the United States Copyright Office as No. TX5-549-995.").
197. 17 U.S.C. § 410(c).
198. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A).
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Further, courts describe the DMCA as providing a new cause of
action rather than a new property right. 199 Specifically, the Act pur-
ports not to "affect rights, remedies, limitations, or defenses to copy-
right infringement. ' 200 The DMCA is simply helping copyright
owners protect rights they already enjoy.20 1 Where the work is regis-
tered with the Copyright Office, it has obtained the rights under Sec-
tion 106.202 Thus, the DMCA should help copyright owners like
Lexmark and Chamberlain enforce their rights.
Various commentators have suggested drawing a line where the
copyrighted work is not independently marketable as a creative prod-
uct.20 3 One suggests a presumption against DMCA protection for
"mixed goods" that combine functional products and copyrighted pro-
grams.20 4 The presumption would not apply to products which are
mainly copyrighted works ensconced in a storage medium. 205 There-
fore, a garage door opener with a small embedded copyrighted pro-
gram would begin with a presumption against protection.206 This
presumption could be overcome by examining consumer expectations,
marketability of the good without the program, and registration with
the Copyright Office. 207
This suggestion is inadvisable because it replaces a bright-line test
with blurred judgments. As written, the DMCA protects all copy-
righted works, provided they meet the other statutory require-
ments.20 8 Revising the code to institute presumptions against mixed-
good manufacturers creates ambiguity and uncertainty. Potential
plaintiffs will not know in advance whether they must overcome a pre-
sumption or whether their copyrighted work is sufficiently "indepen-
dent" so as to begin litigation with DMCA protection. 20 9 Further,
potential defendants cannot be sure whether they will be liable.210
This uncertainty can create higher priced goods as manufacturers at-
199. Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1197.
200. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c).
201. Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1197.
202. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (giving copyright owners the exclusive rights to reproduce, dis-
tribute, publicly perform, publicly display, and make derivative works).
203. Lipton, supra note 42, at 523; see also Howell, supra note 2, at 132 (explaining that
aftermarket goods are not sold separately as are traditional copyrighted works).
204. Lipton, supra note 42, at 526-28.
205. Id. at 525.
206. Id. at 524.
207. Id.
208. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000) (noting that the DMCA applies to "work[s] protected under
this title").
209. Lipton, supra note 42, at 526-28.
210. Howell, supra note 2, at 135-36.
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tempt to protect themselves from future litigation,21 1 and may frighten
manufacturers who are potentially free from DMCA liability into
ceasing production.212
This Comment contends that Congress does not need to amend the
DMCA to provide adequate protection for OEMs, other copyright
holders, and consumers. If Congress does wish, however, to exempt
certain works from liability, any amendment should specifically detail
those works.213 This would help settle the issue, should Congress de-
cide this is the proper course of action.2 14
2. IP Policy Does Not Preclude OEM Protection
Exclusivity and limited monopolies are generally disfavored.215 But
intellectual property law allows inventors and authors some market
dominance to further scientific and creative production. 216 If OEMs
can gain DMCA protection over their embedded works, they are ef-
fectively receiving over seventy years of protection for the entire de-
vice. 217 While this concerns many critics,218 perhaps it may actually
further the progress of science and the arts. Where competitors can
copy embedded codes, they do not need to create new works or new
inventions.219 The generic manufacturer can simply lift the code or
"turn it off" and ride the coattails of the primary manufacturer. 220
While this may promote economic competition, it does not promote
scientific innovation.221 When secondary manufacturers are forced to
independently create their own programs and related mechanical
211. Id. at 146.
212. Id. at 135-36.
213. Various provisions of the Copyright Act already use this specific delineation of works.
See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 102 (detailing the types of works which are copyrightable subject matter,
and specifically excluding protection for an "idea, procedure, process, system, method of opera-
tion, concept, principle, or discovery").
214. See McCardle, supra note 7, at 1032.
215. Howell, supra note 2, at 136-37.
216. Id.
217. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a), (c) (protection extends for the life of the author plus seventy
years, or if a work made for hire, then ninety-five years from publication or 120 years from
creation, whichever is shorter); see also Kitch, supra note 28, at 5.
218. See, e.g., Howell, supra note 2, at 138; see also McCardle, supra note 7, at 1018-19 (argu-
ing Lexmark will frighten manufacturers into not creating new goods for fear of litigation).
219. See Howell, supra note 2, at 150 (suggesting an amendment to the reverse-engineering
exception to allow for "wholesale copying" in order to make devices interoperable).
220. See id. at 141 (pointing out that developing interoperable software often requires copying
portions of the code).
221. McCardle, supra note 7, at 1031.
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parts, they are actually adding to the pool of knowledge. 222 In this
creative process, they may stumble upon better ways to program or
make the product and benefit society more than when they simply
mimic competitors. 223
Additionally, while financial incentive is not the primary purpose of
intellectual property law, Congress does provide some encouragement
to innovate.224 Similarly, Congress drafted the DMCA to include all
copyrighted works.225 Thus, it implicitly endorsed granting program-
mers general copyrights to encourage their further creation and writ-
ing.22 6 If manufacturers cannot obtain protection for their intellectual
property, they may stop creating new goods. 227 Where primary pro-
ducers know a competitor can simply copy their protected code and
reap the benefits, they might not be willing to invest in research and
development. 228 Protecting the works under the DMCA helps keep
OEMs inventing and creating new goods. 2 2 9
DMCA protection is less intrusive than granting patent protection
for the duration of copyright protection. Patents prevent others from
making, using, or selling a protected invention. 230 Thus, if a company
had patent protection over its toner cartridges, no other manufacturer
could create the same type of cartridge-even independently. 231 Cur-
rently, the DMCA effectively gives these producers copyright protec-
tion over the entire device.232 But DMCA protection only extends to
access and traditional copyrights and not to independent creation of a
similar code.233 Thus, a secondary manufacturer can independently
develop software to either create its own toner cartridge or to interact
222. See Kitch, supra note 28, at 10 (suggesting OEMs should write inefficient programs to
nullify competitors' arguments that the OEM's program is the only way to achieve the result,
and force those competitors to develop different programs).
223. See infra notes 316-363 and accompanying text.
224. See generally Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (noting that Congress enacted the
Copyright Term Extension Act to provide income for authors to continue to create new works,
among other things).
225. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2000) ("No person shall circumvent a technological
measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title." (emphasis added)).
226. But see McCardle, supra note 7, at 1020 ("[U]sing the DMCA for the purpose of creating
a monopoly runs directly contrary to Congress's goal of monopoly prevention in antitrust law.").
227. But see id. at 1022 (arguing that OEMs will spend the money initially because the monop-
oly on aftermarket parts will guarantee sales).
228. But see id.
229. See infra notes 347-357 and accompanying text.
230. Kitch, supra note 28, at 5.
231. See Peter Burrows, Ever Wonder Why Ink Costs So Much?, Bus. WK., Nov. 14, 2005, at
42 (discussing one company's allegations of patent infringement against generic ink
manufacturers).
232. Kitch, supra note 28, at 5.
233. S. REP. No. 105-190, at 13 (1998).
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with the primary good. This interoperability strategy is protected
under the reverse-engineering exception. 234 Further, the protection,
while significantly long lasting, is not perpetual.235 If Congress is will-
ing to grant such protection to other copyrighted works, then com-
puter programs-as literary works-must receive similar relief.236
Finally, where OEMs attempt to monopolize the only method of
accomplishing a result, the merger doctrine will protect the public's
interest. 237 Ideas are not copyrightable. 238 Where there is only one
way to convey that idea, it is said that the idea and expression merge,
creating uncopyrightable material.239 In some cases, the OEM's em-
bedded program is the only method of producing the desired result.240
The technological measures used to secure components from inter-
operability are known as "lock-out" codes.241 These lock-out codes
are often more functional than creative or use key information that
protects interoperability. 242 Thus, where the only way to achieve the
handshake between a toner cartridge and the printer is the lock-out
code, the merger doctrine will likely apply.243 These built-in protec-
tions under copyright jurisprudence will protect the market, so no spe-
cial interpretation of the DMCA is required.244
234. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f)(1) (2000). The relevant provision states as follows:
Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a)(1)(A), a person who has lawfully
obtained the right to use a copy of a computer program may circumvent a technological
measure that effectively controls access to a particular portion of that program for the
sole purpose of identifying and analyzing those elements of the program that are neces-
sary to achieve interoperability of an independently created computer program with
other programs, and that have not previously been readily available to the person en-
gaging in the circumvention, to the extent any such acts of identification and analysis do
not constitute infringement under this title.
Id.
235. See supra note 217.
236. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining literary works as "works, other than audiovisual works,
expressed in words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the
nature of the material objects, such as books, periodicals, manuscripts, phonorecords, film, tapes,
disks, or cards, in which they are embodied").
237. Howell, supra note 2, at 137.
238. See Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 705 (2d Cir. 1991) (explaining that only
expressions of ideas are copyrightable).
239. Id. ("[E]ven expression is not protected in those instances where there is only one or so
few ways of expressing an idea that protection of the expression would effectively accord protec-
tion to the idea itself.").
240. Howell, supra note 2, at 142.
241. Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 536 (6th Cir. 2004).
242. Id.
243. Efroni, supra note 2, at 267.
244. Howell, supra note 2, at 137-38. But see Matthew J. Leary, Welding the Hood Shut: The
Copyrightability of Operational Outputs and the Software Aftermarket in Maintenance and Oper-
ations, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1389, 1432 (2005) ("If the merger doctrine prevents copyrightability, the
DMCA would not apply, but if it is only a defense to infringement, it will provide no defense
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B. The Copyright Owner Maintains Authority
to Authorize Circumvention
The circuits are conflicted about whether users can authorize
decryption under the DMCA. 245 The statute prohibits unauthorized
circumvention of technological protections.246 Presumably, the au-
thorization must come from the copyright holder who encrypted the
work. 247 Chamberlain did not grant consumers or competitors explicit
authorization to access the embedded code. 248 But the court held that
because the sale was unconditional, consumers had implied authoriza-
tion to bypass the encryption. 249
The Corley court rejected similar logic. 250 It insisted that the
DMCA provision requiring authority to circumvent a work must be
read in conjunction with the provision being alleged by the plaintiff in
the particular case.25 1 The court noted that one could not sell devices
designed for circumvention where circumvention means decrypting a
measure without authority. 252
The purchaser of a copy of a copyrighted work obtains the right to
"use" that copy.2 53 The copy owner may, of course, read a novel or
view a painting. But ownership of a copy and ownership of a copy-
whatsoever against the DMCA."). Courts disagree about when to apply the merger doctrine;
that is, whether to consider it with regard to the validity of a copyright or to assess it in the
determination of whether infringement has occurred. Id.; see also Kregos, 937 F.2d at 705 ("As-
sessing merger in the context of alleged infringement will normally provide a more detailed and
realistic basis for evaluating the claim that protection of expression would inevitably accord pro-
tection to an idea.").
245. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 78, at 10-11 (arguing that the Federal
Circuit's finding of implied authorization for the user conflicts with the Second Circuit's decision
in Corley).
246. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000).
247. See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 444 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding
no explicit or implicit authorization from the copyright owners to decrypt copyrighted works and
holding that purchase only provides permission to view the work rather than decode it).
248. Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1187 (Fed. Cir. 2004),
cert. denied, 544 U.S. 923 (2005).
249. Id.
250. Corley, 273 F.3d at 444.
251. Id. at 444 n.14 ("When read together with the anti-trafficking provisions, subsection
1201(a)(3)(A) frees an individual to traffic in encryption technology designed or marketed to
circumvent an encryption measure if the owner of the material protected by the encryption mea-
sures authorizes that circumvention.").
252. Id. at 444.
253. Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1202 ("Copyright law itself authorizes the public to make cer-
tain uses of copyrighted materials."); see also 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) (detailing fair use as a
limitation on a copyright holder's exclusive rights).
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right are distinct.254 The copyright owner maintains the rights inher-
ent in creation. 255 Thus, a reader may not copy a novel or adapt the
novel into a screenplay (a derivative work) without the copyright
holder's permission. Courts have not found any implied license to vio-
late these copyrights in the mere purchase of a work. 256 Accordingly,
purchasing a digital copyrighted work gives the buyer the right to
"use" it.257 A consumer may read an e-book, listen to a CD, or watch
a DVD. 258 The copyright holder maintains all rights bestowed on it by
the Copyright Act, including, presumably, rights under the DMCA. 25 9
The DMCA prohibits the disabling of any technology that protects the
copyright.260 The purchaser of the work may not detract from the
copyright holder's rights, including DMCA rights of access. 261 There-
fore, a copy owner may not decrypt any of the works unless
exempted.262
While courts have not found implied licenses for consumers to vio-
late copyrights in traditional works, perhaps there is more room for'
such an interpretation in the context of mechanical goods with ancil-
lary computer programs. Arguably, consumers have less notice that
they are buying a copyrighted work.263 Purchasers know a novel is
copyrightable but probably do not think about the copyrightability of
embedded source code.264  Competitors do understand the inner
workings of such devices.265 They know that copyrighted code is pre-
sent and often deliberately copy or bypass the code to create inter-
254. 17 U.S.C. § 202 ("Transfer of ownership of any material object, including the copy or
phonorecord in which the work is first fixed, does not of. itself convey any rights in the copy-
righted work embodied in the object .... ").
255. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (giving copyright owners the exclusive rights to reproduce, distribute.
create derivative works, publicly perform, and publicly display the work).
256. See, e.g., Red Baron-Franklin Park, Inc. v. Taito Corp., 883 F.2d 275, 281 (4th Cir. 1989)
("[T]he transfer of ownership in a particular copy of a work does not affect Producers' Section
106(4) exclusive rights to do and to authorize public performances." (quoting Columbia Pictures
Indust., Inc. v. Aveco, Inc. 800 F.2d 59, 64 (3d Cir. 1986))).
257. See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
258. See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 444 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting
that a consumer who buys a DVD may view it but not decrypt it); see also United States v.
Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1118 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (explaining that an e-book buyer may
read it but may not e-mail or copy it).
259. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 202, 1201.
260. 17 U.S.C. § 1201.
261. 17 U.S.C. § 202.
262. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f).
263. Lipton, supra note 42, at 524 ("A purchaser of a toner cartridge or garage-door-opening
device may not see software as integral to their purchasing needs.").
264. Id.
265. See S. REP. No. 105-190, at 13 (1998) (noting that software developers currently develop
interoperable products).
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operable goods.2 66 Accordingly, aftermarket manufacturers should
not be able to use lack of notice as an excuse for violating the
DMCA.267 They know they do not have the authority of the copyright
holder to bypass the technological protections.2 68 Applying this logic
to Chamberlain, and assuming the consumers there did not have au-
thority to bypass the opener code, Skylink violated the DMCA when
it sold devices designed for circumvention. 269
One way for manufacturers to overcome the potential lack of notice
for consumers is through the use of shrinkwrap licenses.270 These li-
censes provide buyers with notice of conditions imposed by the manu-
facturer.271  Examples include licenses on computer software
restricting future resale and agreements to abide by a price discrimi-
nation structure.2 72 Such licenses have generally been upheld as via-
ble contracts.273 Lexmark included such a license on its printer
cartridges, contracting with consumers that in exchange for a dis-
counted initial printer price, buyers would purchase only Lexmark
brand cartridges. 274 As the Sixth Circuit did not discuss the question
of authority in its decision,275 these licenses are presumably valid as
providing appropriate notice to consumers. Thus, OEMs should in-
clude these licenses in order to prevent future courts from finding im-
plied unconditional sales. 276 Then, neither the aftermarket producer
nor the consumer has explicit or implicit authority to circumvent the
protections. 277
Finally, critics have suggested application of the first sale doctrine in
these cases. 278 After a primary producer sells a copyrighted work,
even one embedded in a device, it cannot control the future sale or
use of that work.279 But the first sale doctrine protects only future
266. Howell, supra note 2, at 141-42.
267. Id.
268. Cf. Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004),
cert. denied, 544 U.S. 923 (2005). Skylink never claimed it had Chamberlain's permission, but
instead that legitimate purchasers did. Id.
269. But see id. at 1187.
270. Kitch, supra note 28, at 11.
271. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450 (7th Cir. 1996).
272. Id.
273. Id. at 1449.
274. Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 530 (6th Cir. 2004).
275. See generally Lexmark, 387 F.3d 522.
276. Kitch, supra note 28, at 11.
277. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2000).
278. Lipton, supra note 42, at 537-39.
279. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) ("Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the owner of a
particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title ... is entitled, without the author-
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sales, rather than actions which potentially violate other copyrights. 280
When a consumer buys a protected novel, he can resell it without the
copyright owner's permission and does not owe any royalties, but he
cannot reproduce the work or create a derivative work without the
copyright holder's acquiescence. 281 The DMCA arguably created an
additional right of access,2 82 preventing circumvention without per-
mission. 28 3 So while a purchaser of a garage door opener could resell
the system to another, he cannot copy the computer code and sell it.
Further, under the DMCA, he cannot decrypt the code in order to
access it.284 Thus, the first sale doctrine is inapplicable as it protects
only distribution rights.
C. Infringement Is Not a Requirement of a DMCA Claim
As noted above, courts also disagree about the necessity of an in-
fringement claim in DMCA suits. 285 The plain language of the statute
seems to indicate that copyright infringement is not a required ele-
ment of a DMCA cause of action.2 86 The prohibitions in Sections
1201(a)(1) and (a)(2) relate to accessing a work, while Section 1201(b)
forbids the sale of mechanisms which bypass measures protecting cop-
yright owners' rights.287 An important canon of statutory construction
instructs courts to interpret statutes in pari materia: the language
should be read in the context of the whole statute and its surrounding
clauses. 288 Here, it is significant that one portion of the statute specifi-
cally refers to "copyright owners' rights" while another portion does
ity of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or
phonorecord.").
280. See, e.g., Red Baron-Franklin Park, Inc. v. Taito Corp., 883 F.2d 275, 280 (4th Cir. 1989)
("By its very terms, the statute codifying the first sale doctrine ... is limited in its effect to the
distribution of the copyrighted work.... Thus, by its terms, § 109(a) has no application to the
other four rights of a copyright owner ...." (citations omitted)); see also Secure Servs. Tech.,
Inc. v. Time & Space Processing, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 1354, 1364 (E.D. Va. 1989) ("[T]his doctrine
does not permit the first purchaser to allow others to make copies of the copyrighted material.").
281. Secure Servs., 722 F. Supp. at 1364.
282. See infra notes 285-310 and accompanying text.
283. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1); see also S. REP. No. 105-190, at 12 (1998) (noting that previously,
the prohibitions in § 1201(a)(1) did not exist).
284. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A).
285. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 78, at 11 (arguing that the Federal
Circuit's requirement of a showing of infringement conflicts with the Second Circuit's silence on
the issue in Corley).
286. But see Efroni, supra note 2, at 284-85.
287. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)-(2), (b); Efroni, supra note 2, at 285.
288. Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650 (1974) ("When 'interpreting a statute, the court
will not look merely to a particular clause in which general words may be used, but will take in
connection with it the whole statute (or statutes on the same subject) ....' (quoting Brown v.
Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183, 194 (1856))).
[Vol. 56:153
2006] THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT 179
not.289 Interpreting the statute as a whole shows that Congress must
have intended to leave copying out of Section 1201(a).2 90 Accord-
ingly, plaintiffs whose works are decrypted should be able to pursue
claims whether or not they can show infringement.29'
Legislative history shows that Congress drafted the separate subsec-
tions of the Act to protect separate rights. 292 Congress noted that al-
though 1201(a)(2) and 1201(b) both relate to prohibitions on selling
circumvention devices, they deal with discrete rights.293 Specifically,
one section protects access while the other preserves traditional copy-
rights. 294 Congress explained, "[t]he two sections are not interchange-
able, and many devices will be subject to challenge only under one of
the subsections. ' '295 Further, Congress described the purpose of
1201(b) when it stated, "[u]nlike subsection (a), which prohibits the
circumvention of access control technologies, subsection (b) does not,
by itself, prohibit the circumvention of effective technological copy-
right protection measures. '296 Congress went on to clarify that sub-
section (b) requires a connection to rights protected under the
Copyright Act. 297 Thus, legislative history seems to indicate Congress
did indeed create a new right of access distinct from copyrights pro-
tected under the remainder of the Copyright Act.298
Many, including the court in Chamberlain, point to statutory lan-
guage that suggests the DMCA is not creating a new right for copy-
right holders.299  The court took issue with Chamberlain's
interpretation because it would "deny all access to the public. '300 One
might argue, however, that access is related to other rights protected
under the Copyright Act. For instance, decrypting a "pay-per-view"
movie without the owner's permission is illegally accessing the work
289. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a), with 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b).
290. See Kokoszka, 417 U.S. at 650.
291. See Kitch, supra note 28, at 10.
292. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 105-190, at 12 (1998).
293. Id. ("Although sections 1201(a)(2) and 1201(b) of the bill are worded similarly and em-
ploy similar tests, they are designed to protect two distinct rights and to target two distinct clas-
ses of devices.").
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 29.
297. Id.
298. Efroni, supra note 2, at 289; see also Ginsburg, supra note 100, at 26.
299. See, e.g., Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1204 (Fed. Cir.
2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 923 (2005) ("The DMCA does not create a new property right for
copyright owners. Nor, for that matter, does it divest the public of the property rights that the
Copyright Act has long granted to the public.").
300. Id. at 1200.
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and arguably violating the copyright owner's right to distribution.301
Accordingly, protecting the copyright holder's right to prevent access
in turn facilitates the protection of its other rights.302 Under that in-
terpretation, Congress's protection of access does not violate its prom-
ise to leave other Copyright Act protections and rights undisturbed.
Additionally, there is a question as to why Congress needed to en-
act the DMCA if it requires a connection to infringement actions. Be-
cause Section 1201(b) explicitly relates to infringement, it should have
been enough to introduce an additional cause of action against traf-
fickers such as the defendant in Lexmark, who both circumvent a
technological measure and copy the work. 303 In fact, Congress noted
that "[t]he device limitation in 1201(b) enforces the longstanding
prohibitions on infringements. '30 4 But Congress went a step further
and prohibited access that "was never before made unlawful. 30 5
When Congress stated that "[i]t is anticipated that most acts of cir-
cumventing a technological copyright protection measure will occur in
the course of conduct which itself implicates the copyright owners [sic]
rights under [the Copyright Act]," 306 it implicitly recognized that some
circumventions would not include infringement, but would still be
protected. Therefore, the anti-circumvention provisions create new
protections, purposefully disconnected from the requirement of show-
ing a violation of traditional copyrights.
Finally, without protection from mere unauthorized access, the U.S.
is potentially not in compliance with the WCT.30 7 The WCT required
that the United States "provide adequate legal protection and effec-
tive legal remedies against the circumvention of effective technologi-
cal measures that are used by authors in connection with the exercise
of their rights under this Treaty. '308 Congress believed it was neces-
sary to enact legislation to protect against circumvention in order to
comply with the Treaty.30 9 Thus, attaching a requirement of infringe-
ment allegations may put U.S. compliance in question. 310
301. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 78, at 10.
302. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
303. See Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 530-31 (6th Cir.
2004).
304. S. REP. No. 105-190, at 12 (1998).
305. Id.
306. Id. at 29.
307. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 78, at 10.
308. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 440 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting WIPO
Copyright Treaty, art. 11, Apr. 12, 1997, S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-17 (1997), available at 1997
WL 447232).
309. McCardle, supra note 7, at 1004.
310. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 78, at 12.
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IV. IMPACT
If manufacturers can find protection for these strategies under the
DMCA, commentators argue that consumers will suffer for numerous
reasons. First, with competitors unable to participate in the
aftermarket-goods arena, consumers have only one purchase op-
tion.311 Second, analysts predict that innovation will slow as monopo-
listic companies stop improving products and operations efficiency
because they have a captive market.312 They also predict that when
competitors lose sales they will not be able to invest in product devel-
opment.313 Finally, there is concern that smaller corporations may
halt legitimate activity in fear of dominant organizations' legal
power. 31 4 This Part assesses these worries and offers that the impact
on consumers' wallets might be smaller than imagined.
315
A. Locking-In May Not Negatively Affect Pricing
An OEM that successfully prevents competitors from creating in-
teroperable aftermarket goods will be the sole supplier for that re-
placement item. 316 Consumers will be forced to purchase the
aftermarket substitutes from that OEM.317 Because consumers have
only one choice for their replacement parts, scholars believe that typi-
cal economic factors will not regulate prices.318 Additionally, given its
monopoly, an OEM could discount the primary good to encourage
sales and then charge extortionate amounts for the replacement
goods.31 9
Where the cost to buy new equipment is higher than that for the
replacement good, consumers become "locked in" to a specific brand
or manufacturer. 320 This is currently the case with some patented
311. McCardle, supra note 7, at 1021.
312. See id. at 1022.
313. See id. at 1018-19; see also Howell, supra note 2, at 135.
314. McCardle, supra note 7, at 1018-19.
315. See infra notes 316-363 and accompanying text.
316. McCardle, supra note 7, at 1021.
317. Id. ("Consumers ... would be forced to purchase these goods from only one source and
to pay the increased prices that manufacturers demand.").
318. 2A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW $ 403a (2d ed. 2002)
("Monopoly exists when one firm controls all or the bulk of a product's output, and no other
firm can enter the market or expand output at comparable costs." (citation omitted)).
319. McCardle, supra note 7, at 1021; see also Howell, supra note 2, at 134 ("[Any manufac-
turer could reduce the cost of their original product and 'make up the difference' by selling all of
their replacement parts at a significant markup." (citation omitted)).
320. Higgs, supra note 34, at 68.
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goods, 321 including many razor blades. Consumers must buy replace-
ment cartridges from the original manufacturer because the patentee
can legally exclude aftermarket competition. 322
As some experts note, this "locking-in" is generally not "the 'mo-
nopoly' that concerns antitrust. ' 323 They assert that the requirement
of buying only certain branded replacement parts is typically taken
into consideration in the initial pricing.324 For example, in the case of
Chrysler automobiles, which require Chrysler transmissions, "well-in-
formed customers will attribute high prices in Chrysler transmissions
to the cost of owning a Chrysler. If Chrysler competes with Ford,
General Motors, and others, it will lose sales to them. ' 325 These com-
mentators suggest that rather than looking at the aftermarket good
itself, such as a Chrysler transmission, one must examine the entire
package as the applicable market; that is, a Chrysler automobile with
its accompanying parts. 326 The market becomes the combination of
the initial good with its lifetime parts and service. Thus, Chrysler is
not really a monopoly, because it competes with other auto companies
at first purchase.
Similarly, with ink cartridges and garage door openers, informed
consumers will force the market to remain competitive. 327 Where
321. See, e.g., McCardle, supra note 7, at 1019 n.147 (citing Peter Moldave, The DMCA and
Interoperability: A Troubling Legal Strategy in the Aftermarket Industries, 11 E-COMM. L. REP.
(Glasser LegalWorks, Little Falls, N.J.), Oct.-Nov. 2003, at 8). Such locking in is already occur-
ring in the automobile industry. Jennifer Saranow, Where to Get Your Car Fixed, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 29, 2005, at D (describing how large auto makers are withholding computerized diagnostic
tools from independent dealers and providing them only to their own dealerships).
322. See Alan J. Weinschel, Antitrust Pitfalls in Licensing, 792 PRACTISING L. INST. PATS.,
COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, & LITERARY PROP. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 283, 294-97
(2004) (discussing the rights of a patentee in light of the definition of a monopoly).
323. 3A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 762a (2d ed. 2002).
Areeda and Hovenkamp offer the following hypothetical regarding Chrysler automobiles:
To be sure, once a customer has purchased her Chrysler, she can replace the transmis-
sion only with another Chrysler transmission, and this fact may provide Chrysler with
leverage enabling it to charge a higher price than would obtain in a market in which
automobile transmissions are fungible products made by numerous manufacturers. But,
this is not the "monopoly" that concerns antitrust ....
Id.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. See Leary, supra note 244, at 1434 ("Software consumers can participate in preventing
copyright from unnecessarily reducing competition by contract. Both individually and through
user groups, consumers could attempt to force manufacturers to allow the use of operational
outputs by the customer's agents and vendors."); see also Carla Meninsky, Locked Out: The New
Hazards of Reverse Engineering, 21 J. MARSHAL. J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 591, 609 (2003) (ex-
plaining that given the number of consumer advocacy publications and reports, buyers can easily
foresee ultimate costs, thwarting many antitrust suits by competitors).
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consumers are not willing to pledge themselves to one brand for
aftermarket replacement goods, they will shop for other original
equipment. 328 In fact, courts have noted this effect in finding that ver-
tical self-integration 329 is a violation of antitrust law only if that prod-
uct is the best on the market. 330 Otherwise, consumers will not remain
loyal and will search for another brand.33'
Thus, allowing OEMs to protect their aftermarket interfaces will
not create an anti-competitive market.332 Assuming there are other
printer manufacturers, consumers may simply avoid purchasing
Lexmark printers.333 Even if all printer manufacturers use the
DMCA to force consumers to purchase their particular brand of
toner, competition in the overall printer/toner package market will
force price regulation.334 And where consumers are unhappy with any
forced purchasing, demand will create other opportunities such as en-
trepreneurial manufacturers who make printers that can use any
aftermarket toner.335
Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. suggests one potential
wrinkle that could arise where one printer/ink combination, such as
Lexmark's, is the superior product.336 In that case, consumers could
328. Meninsky, supra note 327, at 609.
329. Michael J. Meurer, Vertical Restraints and Intellectual Property Law: Beyond Antitrust, 87
MINN. L. REV. 1871, 1871 n.4 (2003) ("[R]estraints that affect competitors are classified as hori-
zontal, and restraints that affect users or suppliers are classified as vertical.").
330. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 291 (2d Cir. 1979) (stating that a
firm can only achieve monopoly power through vertical integration where its product is pre-
ferred or superior).
331. See John A. Rothchild, Economic Analysis of Technological Protection Measures, 84 OR.
L. REV. 489, 491 n.4 (2005) (citing Robert P. Merges, The End of Friction? Property Rights and
Contract in the "Newtonian" World of On-Line Commerce, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 115, 127
(1997) ("The low transaction costs in this market make search and negotiation quite easy, which
means an alternative source for a given piece of content will almost always exist, thus reducing
the chance that a party will have to accept onerous terms.")).
332. See David McGowan, Website Access: The Case for Consent, 35 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 341,
375 (2003) (asserting that allowing cyberspace companies to protect their property forces effi-
cient bargaining and licensing more than litigation).
333. See 3A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 323, 91 762a.
334. See id.
335. See Rothchild, supra note 331, at 491 n.4 (citing Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property
and the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519, 566 (1999) ("If one information provider tightly locks up his content,
a competing provider may see a business opportunity in supplying a less tightly restricted copy to
customers who might otherwise buy from the first provider.")).
336. 603 F.2d 263, 291 (2d Cir. 1979) In that case, Kodak introduced a new camera that would
work with only its film. Id. at-277-78. A competitor sued alleging an antitrust violation because
consumers who bought either the new film or camera were forced to buy the other due to exclu-
sive interoperability. Id. at 278. The court noted that a new product would not harm competi-
tion unless that product was actually superior to those on the market. Id. at 287.
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be reluctant to change brands to obtain more favorable pricing, creat-
ing an effective monopoly.337 Nothing in Lexmark indicates that con-
sumers favor Lexmark printers over other brands, at least
significantly, so that does not appear to be a problem in these
situations.338
Permitting OEMs this protection also provides them the opportu-
nity to engage in price discrimination.339 Price discrimination exists
where a seller charges various customers different prices based on
each user's valuation of the item.340 This can be beneficial in that it
allows the vendor to sell the product for less to those who cannot oth-
erwise afford it, at the expense of wealthier buyers. 341 Lexmark en-
gaged in this type of price discrimination in its toner purchase
agreement. 342 Users could pay more initially for the printer and buy
any brand of replacement toner or receive a discount on the initial
purchase, but promise to buy only Lexmark toner.343 Similarly,
OEMs may use such purchase agreements to facilitate multi-level
pricing and keep their businesses competitive. 344
Finally, even if courts deny DMCA protection, OEMs may continue
to make it difficult for aftermarket producers to compete-just as in
Berkey Photo-by constantly changing the code necessary for inter-
operability. 345 Where it takes aftermarket competitors months or
years to develop interoperable software, the OEM will continue to
dominate the market.346 Of course, OEMs cannot change their
formula so often that store shelf inventory is obsolete, but certainly
there is some balance that would allow them to exclude competition
and retain retail favor.
B. Companies Will Continue to Innovate
Commentators argue that such monopolies will "stifle innova-
tion. ' 347 The innovation at issue is that of both the generic manufac-
337. Id.
338. See Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 530 (6th Cir.
2004).
339. Rothchild, supra note 331, at 505-06; see also Ginsburg, supra note 100, at 26, 30.
340. Rothchild, supra note 331, at 506.
341. Id.
342. See Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 530.
343. Id.
344. Rothchild, supra note 331, at 506 (noting though that price discrimination is only effec-
tive where manufacturers can avert arbitrage).
345. See 3A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 323, 776a.
346. See id.
347. Howell, supra note 2, at 135.
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turers as well as the monopolistic corporations. 348  First, critics
contend that because competitors cannot circumvent these embedded
software programs, they will cease trying to find newer, cheaper ways
to make and improve aftermarket goods. 349 These generic competi-
tors, however, are generally not market innovators; 350 their model is
to copy products that already exist. 351 They may be somewhat innova-
tive in production efficiencies, giving them a more affordable cost.352
But larger companies like Lexmark probably make the ink cartridges
just as cheaply, using brand equity to increase prices. 353 Thus, the fear
that smaller companies will not innovate is real, but that is already the
case. Additionally, these smaller operations may still attempt to cre-
ate and sell better goods, provided they do not violate DMCA-pro-
tected interfaces. 354 Thus, consumers who own non-Lexmark printers
(or any printers that do not restrict the replacement ink) may buy
these better products.
Most importantly, critics assert that companies with monopolies will
slow their research and development efforts because they have a cap-
tive market and no competition.355 Their theory is that once a manu-
facturer like Lexmark has consumers wedded to its product, it can
afford to sit back on its laurels and wait for the money to roll in.356
This hypothesis is not necessarily correct. Antitrust analysts note that
stifling a company's sales generally impairs innovation.35 7 That is,
where a company is restricted from profiting on its brands or edgy
products, it will cease to create new ones. In this way, where laws do
348. Id. at 135-36.
349. Id. at 134-35; see also Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d
522, 553 (6th Cir. 2004) (Merritt, J., concurring) ("Giving authors monopolies over manufac-
tured goods.., would stifle progress by stamping out competition from manufacturers who may
be able to design better or less expensive replacement parts like toner cartridges."); Howell,
supra note 2, at 134-35 ("[Blecause some aftermarket products do more than mimic the func-
tionality of the original product, control over the aftermarket may stifle legitimate innovation.").
350. See Howell, supra note 2, at 142 ("[R]everse engineering for purposes of interoperability
often requires indiscriminate copying of significant parts, if not all, of copyrighted software
351. Id.; see also Rothchild, supra note 331, at 507-08 (asserting that technological protections
harm competition and innovation by preventing reverse engineering).
352. Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 553 (Merritt, J., concurring).
353. See, e.g., Higgs, supra note 34, at 67-68 ("These manufacturers sell primary products at
or below cost in order to attract customers, then inflate the prices of aftermarket goods or ser-
vices to make their primary sales profitable.").
354. See Howell, supra note 2, at 134-35 (noting that some aftermarket goods actually per-
form original functions).
355. McCardle, supra note 7, at 1022.
356. See id.
357. 3A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 323, 776c4 ("[R]educing the profit from an
innovation tends to reduce the flow of innovations.").
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not protect against interoperable competitor inks, Lexmafk will stop
innovating because it cannot reap the benefits of new designs. But
where Lexmark can earn income from its toner, it will continue to
streamline design and efficiency to keep consumers interested. Thus,
allowing Lexmark to profit from its ink cartridges through use of the
DMCA will actually promote further innovation.
C. Uncertainty in the Law Should Be Rectified
Finally, this Comment agrees with critics who argue that the ambi-
guity in the law must be remedied. 358 Given the current uncertainty,
aftermarket competitors might be timid about continuing to manufac-
ture.359 OEMs may issue cease-and-desist letters to intimidate com-
petitors and coerce them into stopping production of questionable
products, or at least into charging more for their goods in anticipation
of litigation.360 Some courts, however, have awarded damages to de-
fendants where plaintiffs intentionally misrepresented that the
DMCA applied. 361
This vagueness, however, does not necessarily call for a decision in
favor of generic manufacturers. Courts should allow OEMs to protect
their property with the DMCA. While many contend that smaller
companies will be confused and will not know whether they can le-
gally continue creating interoperable products, the law should still be
enforced. 362 Accordingly, it is important to further analyze and assess
the true impact of OEM causes of action under the DMCA to deter-
mine whether the apprehended effect on the market will be
realized. 363
358. Howell, supra note 2, at 135 ("Due to inconsistent application of the statute, aftermarket
manufacturers and their consumers may bow to legal pressure because they are unsure of their
rights.").
359. Id.
360. Id. at 135-36 ("[lit is possible that the costs of aftermarket products are already artifi-
cially inflated simply because there is uncertainty whether or not the DMCA applies to the
aftermarket."); see also Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 552
(6th Cir. 2004) (Merritt, J., concurring) (noting that smaller companies may surrender simply
due to high costs of litigation and discovery); Meurer, supra note 329, at 1881-82 ("[A] patent or
copyright infringement claim gives the IP owner significant strategic advantages because of the
threat of preliminary and permanent injunction, fee-shifting, and treble damages for willful in-
fringement. Furthermore, IP rights can be asserted against innocent strangers ... who might be
vulnerable to an opportunistic IP suit.").
361. Barker, supra note 39, at 62-63 (describing how a defendant received "damages for the
abuse of cease-and-desist letters" (citing Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d
1195 (N.D. Cal. 2004))).
362. Howell, supra note 2, at 135.
363. See David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U.
PA. L. REV. 673, 740 (2000) (explaining that many industries may fail to develop the locking
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Congress enacted the DMCA to protect digital copyrighted works
from piracy.364 The legislation prohibits circumvention of technologi-
cal measures used to protect a copyrighted work.365 Courts have ap-
plied the law in its traditional manner in cases like Corley, which held
a hacker liable for assisting the decryption of DVDs.
366
Other plaintiffs have experienced greater difficulty when trying to
seek relief under the DMCA's provisions. 367 These litigants at-
tempted to prevent competitors from accessing-and in one case cop-
ying-copyrighted and encrypted computer programs in their
competing aftermarket goods. 368 Analysts have expressed outrage at
these attempts, pointing to legislative intent, intellectual property
themes, and public policy as reasons to quash these suits by OEMs.
369
But close analysis reveals that the issues are not so firmly one-sided.
The legislature made provisions for situations like reverse engineering
and other special exemptions, showing they fully anticipated some ef-
fect on aftermarket goods.370 Further, intellectual property law often
rewards inventors and creators with some exclusivity in exchange for
furthering science and the arts.371 Thus, OEMs have some viable ar-
guments for protection.
The circuits are also in disagreement over the interpretation of the
DMCA. 372 Courts differ on the question of whether a user can au-
thorize circumvention, or whether the author or copyright owner
maintains this control.373 Because ownership of a copyrighted work
does not typically transfer copyrights to that owner, it is reasonable to
apply similar rules in this case. 374 Additionally, courts must determine
whether a DMCA cause of action requires an accompanying infringe-
ment claim. Based on the text of the Act and the comments of its
drafters, the DMCA appears to have created an additional copyright
technology or that consumers may force them to cease using it via market forces; thus, it will be
many years before the impact of the DMCA is known). But see Ginsburg, supra note 100, at 36
("Based on the track record so far, § 1201 appears to be performing largely as Congress had
envisioned and should not be overhauled or replaced.").
364. See supra notes 23-41 and accompanying text.
365. See id.
366. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 459-60 (2d Cir. 2001).
367. See supra notes 66-98 and accompanying text.
368. See id.
369. See supra notes 99-162 and accompanying text.
370. See supra notes 175-189 and accompanying text.
371. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
372. See supra notes 245-310 and accompanying text.
373. Id.
374. Id.
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of access apart from infringement. 375 In any case, conflict among the
circuits must be resolved so future potential litigants will know their
rights and liabilities.
The full impact of protection of linked aftermarket goods is not cur-
rently known, and it may take years or decades to assess.376 While
many argue OEM protection creates anticompetitive monopolies,
some economists put their faith in informed consumers and market
forces. 377 Ultimately, the courts must rule definitively so uncertainties
are diminished and OEMs, competitors, and consumers can proceed
in their best interests. 378
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